This paper reports on a study to provide insights into the magnitude of the shocks associated with the recent global economic crisis in macroeconomic terms in South Africa, the country's capacity to withstand or cushion these shocks, and the extent of fragility in terms of poverty levels and child wellbeing. The analysis combines macroeconomic and micro-economic tools to assess the extent of the crisis' impact on the country. The study finds that the poverty headcount ratio increases little in the moderate crisis scenario, but substantially under the severe scenario. However, under both scenarios there is a relatively successful return to close to the business as usual trend. It is important to note though that under both scenarios, more poverty sensitive measures (the poverty gap ratio and the poverty severity ratio) decline more, and remain in negative territory longer, showing that the major impact of the crisis is on the poorest, and that this impact is most difficult to overcome.
Introduction
The United States of America subprime mortgage crisis which began in August 2007 degenerated into a full-scale global financial crisis between August and October 2008. After a lag, the crisis began to be felt by South Africa. The country has especially been affected by the sharp fall in demand for its export products, the fall in prices of key export commodities and falling foreign investment. The economy was recently plunged into a recession for the first time in 17 years and its macroeconomic forecasts have had to be revised downwards substantially 1 . The declining growth has potentially negative implications for incomes, employment, investment and on social programmes partly through the slowdown's effect on tax revenues for government.
Poverty in the country is much higher than one would expect in a country with its level of per capita gross domestic product (GDP). There is a high degree of inequality in the country, and it has its origins in the apartheid policies of the past. Child poverty, in turn, is still much higher than poverty amongst adults. There is widespread concern that the global economic crisis may have exacerbated the situation. This makes it imperative to deal with the phenomenon of child poverty as a specific issue. This is necessary to prevent large numbers of children growing up in dire circumstances that can prevent them from developing their potential.
Economically, childhood poverty also leaves a mark in terms of poor human capital and lower productivity in later life, thus creating the risk of a vicious cycle of poverty.
To ensure that upward mobility of those born into poor families is possible, South Africa needs to create conditions that will reduce child poverty.
This paper (to our knowledge the first of its kind) studies the impact of the world economic crisis on child poverty in South Africa. It does this by linking a macroeconomic Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to micro-economic analysis in order to identify the channels through which economic performance may impact on child poverty and to estimate its likely magnitude.
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 describes the data used for the model and the profile of child poverty while section 3 discusses the model and simulations. Section 4 reports and discusses results of the various simulations and section 5 concludes.
1 Gross domestic product at market prices quarter on quarter growth figures for South Africa reveal that the economy experienced three quarters of negative growth (from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009). The definition of a recession is when a country experiences two successive quarters of negative quarter on quarter growth on a seasonally adjusted basis.
Data and the profile of child poverty
The Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) used for the CGE model is based on the 2005
Supply and Use tables obtained from Statistics South Africa and other national data sets from various sources such as the Reserve Bank. The SAM has 54 activities and 54 commodities; two factors of production, labour and capital; four agents (households, enterprises, government and the rest of world); and two accumulation accounts (change in inventories and gross fixed capital formation).
Trade parameters are obtained from Gibson (2003) while low-bound export supply and demand elasticities are obtained from Behar and Edwards (2004) . To our knowledge, estimates for parameters used in production functions and in households' demand functions are not available for South Africa. Therefore values from the literature surveyed by Annabi et al. (2006) were used.
One of the main transmission channels of the crisis is a decrease in export and import prices and demand. Table 1 presents trade relations between South Africa and the rest of the world in 2005. It specifies the import penetration rate as well as the sectoral share of imports in total imports. Moreover, it details the sectoral export intensity rates measured as a share of exports in production in each sector and the share of each sector's exports in total exports. To derive a profile of child poverty, we set a poverty line at the 40th percentile of household per capita income in the 2005 Incomes and Expenditure Survey (IES) 2 . Naturally, there are important issues about the appropriate poverty line and about whether it would make a difference if some adult equivalent scale were used instead of per capita income. However, we have dealt with that in another work (Streak, Yu and Van der Berg, 2009) . We concluded that the profile of poverty is not really affected by using any adult equivalent scale and that there is stochastic poverty dominance across most dimensions 3 . In other words, the poverty profile would not change much if an alternative poverty line or an alternative poverty measure to the headcount ratio were used. Therefore, using per capita income rather than adult equivalent income shows that our findings on the insensitivity of the child poverty profile to the choice of adult equivalence scale support the argument of Woolard and Leibbrandt (2006) . This is that one may as well use the simple per capita method of profiling poverty in South Africa and testing its robustness to alternative poverty lines. Table 2 presents the profile of child poverty. Poor households tend to be larger. Therefore, the poverty headcount for the population as a whole is 52.9%. However, poorer households have a disproportionate number of children: 65.5% of children are amongst the poor (this converts into 11.8 million poor children) 4 as against only 45.2% of the adult population. Moreover, similar differences between adult and child poverty apply for the depth and severity of poverty. In fact, the proportional differentials are larger, indicating that children's share of the poverty headcount rises if lower poverty lines are used because of more severe poverty amongst children compared to adults. With respect to age, Table 2 illustrates that the poverty headcount and poverty shares based on the headcount are highest amongst the youngest age cohort, followed by children aged between 5 and 14 and between 15 and 17. The profile also confirms the racial dimension of child poverty, which is much higher amongst black children and high amongst coloured children 5 . The poverty depth and severity measures are also far higher for children from these groups. There is little gender difference in child 2 The line is arbitrary, but agrees with what a number of other authors have used, particularly in assessing the effect of the adult equivalence scale. 3 The exception is the provinces. There is no stochastic poverty dominance across this dimension, thus there are some provinces where the poverty ranking would change if another poverty line or another poverty measure were used. 4 This level, though somewhat arbitrary considering the equally arbitrary choice of the poverty line, can be seen in the context of findings based on earlier data sets that used similar poverty cut offs. The National Institute for Economic Policy (NIEP) measurement study (1996) , which is based on the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD) of 1993, and which used the old Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Adult Equivalent Scale (AES), found the poverty headcount amongst children aged between birth and 4 years of age to be 60%. Woolard (2002) , using the October Household Survey (OHS) 1999, a welfare indicator of adult equivalent income and a Cutler and Katz (1992) type AES with the child cost parameter set at 0.6 and economies of scale parameter at 0.9, found it to be 59.2% amongst children aged between birth and 17 and 59.3% amongst children aged between birth and 6. Thus the poverty findings here are not all that different from those in previous studies, whereas there is somewhat less child poverty if the suggested Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) poverty line is used. 5 Defining households by colour is one of the popular ways used in South Africa. Including the race-based definition is rooted in the apartheid period policies. The 'black' people of South Africa are natives of the country. They include mainly the Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele, Swazi, Sotho-Tswana, Tsonga and the Venda language groups. 'White' people are mainly descendents of the colonial immigrants of Dutch, German, French Huguenot and British origin. 'Coloureds' are most commonly people of a mixed race or descendants of the Khoi and San. 'Asians' are mainly people of Indian descent (South Africa. Info, 2007). poverty. Child poverty is still more prevalent, deeper and more severe in rural areasnearly two thirds of children identified as poor live in rural areas. Its rural face is the most prominent feature of child poverty in South Africa, and this especially applies when the depth and severity of poverty are considered: the rural poor are further below this poverty line than the urban poor are, and the share of the rural child poverty headcount thus rises as the poverty line is set lower. There is large variation across provinces in child poverty. Though the poverty incidence is highest in Limpopo, the poverty share of the more populous provinces is larger. Kwazulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape together have 46% of the poor children. The rankings for the poverty severity measure are slightly different from those on the depth and headcount measures. This indicates that stochastic poverty dominance does not always hold. Kwazulu-Natal has the most severe poverty, while it has the second highest poverty depth and the third highest poverty headcount. Limpopo ranks third in terms of the severity and depth measures, but first on the poverty headcount measure. Western Cape is the best performer on all three of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measures -it has the lowest child poverty headcount rate (P0) 6 , the lowest depth of child poverty (also known as the child poverty gap ratio [P1]) 7 and the lowest child poverty severity ratio (P2) 8 . Testing the robustness of the child poverty profile to select the poverty line found the age, race, gender, and urban-rural dimensions to be robust. In the poverty-relevant range, there is clear first order dominance in each of these cases. This implies that the poverty rankings are invariant to the poverty line chosen and to whether the poverty measure used is P0, P1 or P2. Figure 1 below shows that the results for the provincial rankings are slightly more complex and hence the provincial cumulative density functions or curves (CDFs) or poverty incidence curves. The CDF shows the population arranged from poorest to richest using the selected poverty measure and expresses those below any possible poverty line as a percentage of the total population (Deaton, 1997) . In other words, it shows the headcount ratio of poverty at different poverty lines. It is therefore also known as a poverty incidence curve. Regardless of where the poverty line is drawn, Western Cape and Gauteng have the lowest child poverty headcount rates. However, the Western Cape has the lowest headcount up to an income level of approximately R6 000 per capita, per annum. Thereafter, however, there is a change. Except for the very low poverty lines, three provinces -Kwazulu-Natal, Limpopo and Eastern Cape -have the highest poverty headcounts. There is also a shift in the rankings of the weakest performers when alternative poverty lines are selected. Where one CDF consistently lies above another, there is first-order stochastic poverty dominance. This implies that the ranking of poverty between two provinces remains unchanged whatever poverty line is used and whichever of the three FGT poverty measures (P0, P1 or P2) is analysed. The intersections of the lines implies that both the poverty line chosen and whether the poverty measure used is the headcount, depth or severity of child poverty affect the ranking of child poverty. This confirms the results from Table 2 . It does matter which measure is used, and this analysis implies that the choice of the poverty line itself is important for ranking poverty between provinces. At very low poverty lines, the severity of child poverty that Kwazulu-Natal experiences will be reflected even in the headcount index. However, if poverty lines are set high, there is a danger of underestimating Kwazulu-Natal's child poverty share when focusing on the headcount rate only. The profile of child poverty in South Africa presented here, based on IES 2005, suggests that child poverty (at 65.5%) remains more extensive than poverty amongst the population as a whole (52.9%) and poverty amongst adults (45.2%), if the chosen poverty line includes 40% of poor households. This confirms that children are found more often in poorer households. Moreover, despite the massive injection of transfers to households with poor children through child support grants, poverty amongst children remains substantial. The child poverty profile sheds new light on the age dimensions of child poverty. The headcount, depth and severity of poverty are all higher amongst children in the youngest age cohort (birth to 4) followed by children aged 5 to 14, followed by those aged 15 to 17. This is surprising because the child support grant did not extend to the oldest group at the time of the survey. One would expect households containing only older children to experience more poverty.
Methodology:
To evaluate the impacts of the world economic crisis on South Africa, a sequential dynamic CGE model based on the dynamic Poverty and Economic Policy (PEP 1-t) standard model by Decaluwé et al (2009) was used, changing several assumptions to better reflect the South African economy. The model has two production factors, capital and labour. Labour is further disaggregated into informal, unskilled, semiskilled and highly skilled workers. The production function technology is assumed to be of constant returns to scale and is presented in a four-level production process. At the first level, output is a Leontief function of value added and total intermediate consumption. At the second level, a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function represents the imperfect substitution between composite labour and capital.
At the third level, composite labour demand is also a CES function between composite skilled and composite unskilled labour. Note that the composite skilled demand is a CES with a low elasticity between skilled and semi-skilled workers, reflecting the fact that it is difficult to substitute semi-skilled for skilled workers. We also use a CES to describe the composite unskilled labour demand between informal and unskilled workers.
South Africa faces high unemployment and has a highly unionised labour force that has substantial bargaining strength. As a result, wages and salaries are strongly rigid downwards. To take this rigidity into account, it is assumed that wages cannot decline below some minimum. Thus, if production decreases, producers will not be able to adjust through a reduction in wage levels, and will therefore have to retrench some workers.
As South Africa is a small country, world prices are assumed exogenous. However, South African exporters face a less than infinite foreign demand for exports. In order to increase their market share on the world market, exporters need to reduce their Free On Board (FOB) prices for exports. Factor supplies are fixed in the first period and then grow at the population rate for labour force and using an accumulation equation for capital (Jung and Thorbecke, 2001) . Transfers between institutions and government consumption in volume are fixed at the base year and then grow at the population rate. The rest of the world's savings are modelled as a fixed proportion of
GDP.
An innovation of our study is that we split the economy into four different groups of activities. Each group is defined by its degree of dependency/exposure to the global crisis and is assumed to be affected differently by the crisis. The four groups are defined as follows (see Table in -15% in 2008 -15% in and 2009 -15% in -10% in 2008 -15% in -2009 -15% in , and +1% in 2010 -15% in Strongly affected -20% in 2008 -15% in and 2009 -15% in -10% in 2008 -15% in -2009 In terms of foreign financing of domestic firms, we assume that foreign transfers to The economy-wide model just described was used together with a micro model of the economy, to estimate the likely effect of the economic crisis on child poverty in South Africa. Essentially, the major purpose of the micro model was to estimate the effect of the economic changes simulated by the CGE model on households through three channels:
1.
Variations in prices, which were assumed to apply to all households.
Differences only arose in their spending habits. Note that adult equivalence scales were also applied to allow for differential spending patterns.
2.
Variations in wages in different skill categories. 
Results
Given the magnitude of the different shocks, each scenario will generate differential outcomes on output, the entire price structure and, consequently, factor reallocation.
However, the final impact on households will depend on their factor endowments and their sources of income, including transfers, as well as their consumption patterns.
The results of the CGE analysis are discussed first and then followed by the results of the micro modelling.
Results from the CGE model
The CGE model assumes that in order to gain foreign market share, South African exporters must reduce their FOB prices, taking into account prices of competitors and the world elasticity of demand for South African goods. Table 5 summarises the impact of the two scenarios on South African FOB prices. As can be seen, there is a huge decrease in exports prices following the drop in international prices and demand.
The decrease is of course much greater for the severe scenario. For the strongly affected sectors the drop of these prices is a little less than the drop in world export The drop of world prices of imports will reduce the domestic cost of imported goods even if the reduction is, in percentage points, a little less than the reduction in world price. For the moderate scenario, in 2008, we observe that import prices drop more than local prices for strongly and mildly affected sectors. As expected, these sectors experience a relative increase in imports compared to domestic purchases. The opposite pattern is observed for the weakly affected or non-affected sectors. It is important to note for the latter that there is a decrease in import prices due to margins.
As expected, results reported in Table 6 show that exports decrease strongly for products belonging to the strongly affected sectors, and deeper in the severe scenario.
In 2008, at the beginning of the crisis, exports decrease by 21.5% for strongly affected sectors under the severe scenario. The drop in world demand has a direct effect on exports and the lower reduction in FOB prices with respect to world prices also reduces the performance of exports.
It is important here to understand the behaviour of the non-affected sectors. Globally speaking, they benefit from the difference between local prices (that are sharply decreasing) and export prices (that are hardly affected)). The real exchange rate depreciates strongly and this movement favours only those exporting sectors that are not affected by the reduction in foreign demand and international prices. For instance, the gold sector, a non-affected sector, sees its volume of exports increasing by 3.1%
in 2008 in the moderate scenario and by 10.6% in the severe scenario. A sharp decrease is also noted on the import side. As will be shown later, total income of households will drop substantially, leading to a huge reduction in total absorption and a reduction of demand for imported goods. In the moderate scenario this demand reduction is sufficient to compensate for the positive expansion effect of lower import prices. Altogether, imports fall by 2.1% in the strongly and mildly affected sectors.
However this decrease will be greater for non-affected and weakly affected sectors as the local price falls more than the import price. One should also keep in mind the constraint set on the current account balance, which is assumed to remain fixed relative to GDP. This assumption implies that if the country's exports decrease, then its imports would have to follow the same path.
As explained previously, the contraction on the demand side translates into fewer imports. This will affect domestic demand even more dramatically due to the increased competitiveness of foreign products created by the reduction in import prices. The decrease in the total demand for goods will have consequences for sectoral production. One would actually expect production to decrease most strongly for sectors strongly dependent on exports. On the other hand, sectors that are not directly affected by the crisis might be affected by a reduction of demand from other sectors, for instance in terms of intermediate consumption. Finally, all the groups are affected by the crisis and see their production decrease. The decrease in the production of most of the sectors will have a number of consequences.
Firms that see their exports and production fall will retrench workers as they are unable to adjust the nominal wage of labour. As unions are strong, producers will not be able to decrease wage rates to adjust to the fall in prices and demand, so they will have to dismiss more workers. Only non-affected sectors, and notably the gold sector, benefit from the crisis. We saw earlier that gold production was increasing, and this is leads to job creation in this sector. The process of retrenchments will not be uniform across the different labour categories (Table 7) In the BAU, for each labour category, we observe that unemployment is decreasing through time due to the fact that capital grows faster than labour. Results reported in Table 8 show that for highly skilled workers only, in the base year, the unemployment rate is very low (1%) and actually decreases in the BAU to reach 0% in 2007. In 2009, in the severe scenario, for skilled workers, their unemployment rate reaches a little more than 20%. Recall that there are actually four types of labour in the model, the three described above and informal labour. Assuming no unemployment of informal labour, the impact of the crisis for this type of labour will be on their wage rate, which falls sharply (-5% in 2008 in the moderate, and -22% for the severe scenario). In the same way, it is not surprising to see a decrease in the rate of return of capital in most sectors, as most of them are affected by the crisis either through a drop in selling prices or demand. Taking these results into account, we can now analyse what happens to the different agents following the crisis.
The sharply decreasing rate of return to capital leads to strong negative effects on firm income as this component represents 88% of their total income. Moreover, one of the channels through which the crisis operates is modelled as a decrease in transfers from abroad. Thus, we expect firms' income to decrease even more. Firm income decreases by 16% in 2008 in the severe scenario, and even in the long run it cannot return to its BAU level.
Firm savings are obtained after removing from their income the amount of direct taxes paid to the government as well as transfers to other institutions (mainly households and the rest of the world). We expect a dramatic fall in firm saving which is more pronounced in the short run. This decrease in firm savings will have important consequences for total investment. Indeed, firm savings represent 80.5% of total investment. Here again, we can see that, even in the moderate scenario, the effect of the crisis remains in the long run as firm savings remains below its BAU level (-1.5%).
Households receive income from labour and transfers from firms, government and the rest of the world. We assume that transfers from government and the rest of the world are fixed, whereas transfers from firms are a proportion of firm income. As household income is mainly based on labour income, we expect it to decrease. Moreover, as mentioned previously, firm income is decreasing and so are the dividends it pays.
Thus, household income decreases sharply in both scenarios. This decrease negatively affects household consumption and savings and thus total absorption through a reduction in consumption and investment.
Government revenue is expected to decrease. Indeed, direct taxes are decreasing (as a share of households and firm income), and taxes on products are also decreasing for most sectors (due to the decreases in imports and production). Half of government income comes from direct taxes and around a third from indirect taxes on products.
The drop in these two components will contribute to a total decrease in government revenue and a substantial increase in its deficit.
In both scenarios made about the severity of the crisis, GDP falls in 2008 and 2009 and then increases again. However, it does not return to its BAU value even by 2015.
In other words, without positive shocks or deliberate and successful interventions to stimulate the economy and counteract the negative effect of the world crisis, GDP will not recover to what it would have been without the crisis. Given all the preceding effects, it is no surprise to observe a huge decrease in total investment. What is relevant here is that, even though the crisis affected only 2008 and 2009 and the recovery started in 2010, the effects on investment remain in the long term. Both scenarios predict lower investment in 2015 than the BAU does 9 .
Results from the micro-model In summary, the cumulative density functions indicate that the effect of the moderate scenario is not that large. In contrast, the effect of the severe scenario is great, particularly at the lower levels. Clearly, we are dealing with poverty effects that affect the poorest most.
Using a lower poverty line confirms what the CDFs and the magnitude of the effects on P1 and P2, relative to P0, have already intimated. This is that the major effect of the crisis is closer to the bottom of the income distribution. At the lower line, the effect of the severe scenario is to increase the poverty headcount ratio more than was the case at the higher line.
Another way of looking at this is to separate the effects on child poverty in urban and rural areas. Poverty amongst children is more severe in rural than in urban areas. In 2007, before the crisis, poverty amongst children in urban areas was 44.9% as against 58.7% in rural areas. The economic crisis appears to have a similar effect in terms of who crosses the poverty line in urban and in rural areas, as the rise in P0 is quite similar in magnitude. However, the crisis affects already poor children in rural areas much more. P2 rises by 55% in urban areas in 2009 and by 136% in rural areas, using the severe scenario. All poverty measures improve a little in urban areas, while P2
deteriorates by 31% in rural areas if one applies the moderate scenario. Even the price effects, which tend to moderate the difference at lower incomes, cannot overcome the greater effect of labour market events in rural areas. This clearly needs a longer run to determine the positive effect of a return to economic growth.
The greater effect of the crisis at lower income levels and in rural areas may, at first glance, appear strange. However, further investigation shows that, although much of the income loss occurs in urban areas and even among skilled workers, these people are better protected against job losses because they are often members of households that have a variety of other income sources. Apart from social grants, which have a similar effect of diversifying income among the poor, the poor and rural dwellers are, in many cases, quite weakly protected against job loss. It is therefore not surprising that they fall below, or further below, the poverty line when they lose their jobs.
If one separates that part of the effect caused by price changes and job losses, we see that the effect of job losses is by far the greater. Nevertheless, price changes do play an independent role and in some situations serve to moderate the effect of poverty on rural compared to urban areas. This particularly applies to people close to the poverty line. 
Conclusion
Child poverty is high and has already long been a source of concern in South Africa, thus the progress made in the past decade to reduce it through expanding the child grant system was very important. This paper has shown that a decrease in world prices, together with the drop in world demand, led to a fall in production for most sectors. This reduces employment and unemployment rates increase as a result.
Households see their income drop. The situation is worse for informal workers who How likely are the two scenarios discussed? One should consider that the CGE model specifically attempted to isolate the effects of the global financial crisis, separate from the earlier but perhaps enduring effects of the international fuel and food crises. Thus actual outcomes may be worse than modelled. It appears, from present knowledge, as if the moderate scenario may better reflect the course of the international economy than the severe scenario. Further, it appears as if the economic impact of the crisis has been less than under the severe scenario, yet the employment effects appear considerably worse than the moderate scenario. This may be the result of even greater wage rigidities (increasing wages during an economic crisis) than allowed for in the macro-model.
The time period over which this paper has looked at the crisis did not really allow for a policy response in terms of anti-poverty policy. In fact, such responses are always slow to implement and depend largely on existing institutions. The Child Support
Grant in South Africa is a major instrument to this end, as it is already in place and protects the vulnerable both before the crisis and during it. Moreover, in principle it is possible to use it to expand transfers to households, though the constellation of fiscal forces in South Africa (the fact that grants are already being expanded very rapidly) and the relatively short duration of this crisis reduced its potential role during this crisis.
It needs to be emphasised that this paper did not consider household and individual responses to poverty, which may have unknown impacts on actual poverty outcomes, particularly for children, who cannot protect themselves from the impact. Intrahousehold behaviour, for instance the extent to which households allocate their resources to protect children from the worst effects of the crisis, is of particular importance. But household formation, dissolution and fracturing can all occur in response to changing economic situations. To some extent, the Child Support Grant mitigates the possible impact of such behaviour on children, as it makes it more attractive to have them as part of the household.
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